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Abstract 
Remote Desktop Applications (RDA) such as Virtual Network Computing (VNC), Cisco WebEx, GoToMeeting 
and LogMeIn have been adapted and utilised recently. This is because they facilitate tier-one support to 
configure computers, networks and solve application-related issues from a remote location. The direct benefit 
from the use of these applications, is the time (and therefore cost) saving for organisations. Unfortunately, 
“remoting” technology can also be used by criminals to perform illegal activities, hence remote applications are 
of key interest to law agencies and forensic investigators. The research outlined in this paper aims to identify 
any artefacts left behind by common remote applications and technologies used by many firms. These artefacts 
can be vital to government law enforcement agencies and forensic investigators, as they could be used as 
evidence in cyber-crime investigations. This research will focus on RealVNC, TightVNC, Cisco WebEx, 
GoToMeeting and LogMeIn applications. The findings from the research shows some artefacts left behind by the 
applications, which can be used by forensics investigators or law enforcement for possible evidence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
RDA allow organisations and individuals to access a computer or network remotely, where physical access to 
the network is not available or where access to the device is impractical. Such applications facilitate access to 
computers as though a user is sitting right in front of his/her computer. There are various types of RDA currently 
used by many organisations and individuals such as VNC, LogMeIn, Citrix GoToMyPc, LogMeIn and 
TeamViewer. The increasing adoption and use RDA has also increased the potential for cyber threats to be 
realised against organisations  
However, using the application can be slow over the internet depending on the Internet connection speeds. Some 
remote applications such as VNC have had security issues in past due to using weaker encryption 
implementations (Kerai, 2010). It is plausible that similar issues exist in other remote applications, or still exist 
in VNC. 
In this paper, we detect and retrieve any artefacts left behind by RDA on a Windows computer. Client software 
for five common remote applications (RealVNC, TightVNC, LogMeIn, Teamviewer and Citrix GoToMyPc) will 
be installed individually on a Windows 10 computer, and test remote connections will be initiated that we expect 
will create configuration changes on the computer. The information will be forensically analysed to find any 
artefacts left by the application on the computer. The paper outlines the location of the artefacts and the types of 
information left by the application.  
RealVNC, TightVNC, LogMeIn, Teamviewer and Citrix GoToMyPc remote applications was used for to 
conduct the research. The findings will show whether the R leave any artefacts, and this can help law 
enforcements for forensic investigations. 
BACKGROUND 
Computer forensics is computer science used to aid legal process in investigations (Brown, 2006). It is the 
process of obtaining, identifying, extracting, analysing and documenting digital evidence for use as evidence in 
legal case (Brown, 2006; Kerai, 2010). However, forensics analysis need to be followed in a defined procedure 
which is accept by the law court. A guideline defined in HB171 (HB171, 2003) is currently used as a guide to 
carry out forensics investigations and manage electronic evidence.  
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It is important to follow a standard procedure when performing acquisition of electronic evidence when 
performing a forensic investigation (Hannay, 2008). It is important to acquire the evidence without modifying or 
damaging it and validating the evidence is the same as original. This is done by chain of custody and 
documentation.  
Forensic analysis for remote protocols has been an area of interest for the law enforcements and other 
government and state agencies. This is because these applications can be used to also perform cyber-crimes and 
illegal communications. A previous research done by (Kerai, 2010), showed that VNC and Microsoft Remote 
Desktop Protocol left behind artefacts, connection and application logs on a computer system locally. The 
research showed that the VNC application and Remote Desktop Protocol leaves some artefacts on the Windows 
Registry File System and other also connection and other application logs on the computer system locally. 
REMOTE DESKTOP APPLICATIONS 
Demand for RDA has increased with time, where a user can remotely connect, manage and configure another 
computer or networks. Connectivity between a user’s computer to another remote computer can be achieved 
with readily available hardware and software to connect you virtually to any remote network. The constraint is 
cost and bandwidth issue that is associated with some technologies (Hoogenboom & Steemers, 2000).  
There are various remote desktop applications and technologies available in recent years that can be used to 
remote in and fix a computer related issues. Online tools like LogMeIn and Citrix GoToMyPc are easy to use, 
reliable and secure (TeamViewer, 2016). However, standalone applications such as RealVNC, TightVNC, 
UltraVNC, Teamviewer and others are applications will require the user to configure the application on the 
computer for a remote connection, which may require some technical skills.  
VNC (Virtual Network Computing) - VNC was first developed by the Olivetti and Oracle Laboratory as their 
telephony system. Later the technology was acquired by AT&T labs and the owners of the technology formed 
RealVNC to continue working with the remote technology.  
The VNC application uses a Remote Frame Buffer protocol to remote access a graphical user interface of the 
connected device. The application uses TCP 5900 and TCP 5800 for web based remote access. Hence it enables 
users and organisation to access network resources remotely over the internet. The application has two 
independent versions, the client and the server, both versions run on most operating system platforms. This 
makes it very popular as anyone using Windows operating system can remote in to a Linux-based computer or 
Mac OSX based computer and vice versa. However, a server instance needs to be installed on a computer and a 
client is then used to access the server. Previous research has shown and discussed the results on how the VNC 
connection works and the security features and weakness it has (Kerai, 2010).  
Other remote support applications such as LogMeIn, GoToMyPc and Teamviewer use TCP port 443 and have 
different application architecture and implementation than VNC application, due to them being web client based 
rather than standalone. Hence the artefacts might be different compared to VNC application.  
Next session outlines the lab setup and materials used to analyse the remote applications. The research outlines 
artefacts left by the applications and individual or remote connection information. These artefacts and 
information can be used by forensics investigators and law agencies in court of law as evidence, in a cyber-crime 
related criminal case. 
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EXPERIMENTAL SETUP  
Various software and tools were used during the data collection, acquisition and analysis of the raw dd image of 
the Windows operating systems (see table 1). Different virtual machines and images were used to analyse the 
application independently.  
Table 1: Tools used in Experiments 
Applications 
VMware Workstation v12 
professional 
Windows 10 operating system was installed and created separate instances of 
each application for analysis. 
Remote Desktop Applications  Real VNC version 5.3.2 
 TightVNC version 2.7.10 
 Citrix GoToMyPC 
 Teamviewer 
 LogMeIn 
Password Recovery Tools  Abel and Cain v 4.9.35 – This is a password recovery and sniffing 
tool used to capture network traffic and sniff passwords. 
 VNCPass 
 VNCSniff 
Windows File System Tools  Microsoft Sysinternal Suite 
ANALYSIS  
All RDA were independently analysed on a virtual machine running the Windows 10 operating system. An 
ADSL router by default does not have remote connections to computers externally, this is because the router 
does not have remote protocol ports open on the router firewall. For VNC connection to work the user needs to 
open TCP port 5900 and TCP port 5800 for the Java client. However other mentioned remote applications run on 
TCP port 443, therefore they do not need special ports opened on the router. Once a VNC application is installed 
on a computer it automatically opens the ports on the local Windows firewall.  
VNC applications use Data Encryption Standard (DES)which has proven to be insecure due to its small key size 
(56-bit). Due the weak encryption algorithm, an attacker can sniff the traffic after cracking the encrypted 
password. 
Windows Registry Analysis 
The Windows registry is a central hierarchical database used by the Windows Operating System, to store all the 
information that is necessary to configure and manage applications and hardware devices installed on the system 
(MicrosoftSupport, 2016). The registry hive is a group of root keys and sub keys that contain application data 
(Alghafli, Jones, & Martin, 2010). There are five logical hives in the Windows Registry, the application registry 
values are most stored under the HKEY_CURRENT_USER, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE and HKEY_USERS 
registry hives. 
RealVNC  
RealVNC configuration is stored in the Windows registry, including encrypted login passwords, settins and 
outbound connections made to the RealVNC servers. The default Windows registry viewer was used to analyse 
the data and artefacts of the application. The connection server password used by the RealVNC server is 
encrypted with DES encryption, since DES encryption is weak, the password can be retrieved easily. Tools such 
as Cain and Abel, VNC Crack and online password cracking web services can crack DES encryption with no 
cost, due to readily available tool to decrypt the encryption. Table 2 shows the artefacts left by RealVNC 
application on Windows 10 machine. 
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Table 2: RealVNC Windows Registry Analysis 
Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\vncviewer\MRU, the application 
stores all the history of the external IP addresses connections made to an external VNC 
server.  
Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\vncserver, the application 
stores encrypted password of the RealVNC server. The password is encrypted with DES 
encryption standard. Since DES is a weak encryption standard, decrypting the password is 
possible.  
Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\vncserver, the application also 
stores configuration settings such as, if the application is personal or enterprise edition, RSA 
private key and the authentication scheme used. 
Under the HKEY_USERS\Software\RealVNC\vncserver, the application stores the vncserver 
license key. 
 
 
Table 3: RealVNC Logs on Windows File System 
 The application leaves log information in the Windows Event Viewer under the Application Logs. The 
logs show client IP address that made the connection to the RealVNC server, and the connection logs 
for the computer made a connection to another VNC server. 
 The RealVNC application stores the connections and application log settings on the hard drive. The log 
file includes all the connection details, including the client IP address and any files transferred during 
the connection. The file is located under C:\Program Files\RealVNC\VNC Server\Logs or C:\Program 
Files (x86) \RealVNC\VNC Server\Logs. 
However, by default the application logging is not enabled, therefore a user will need to enable logging 
for the logs to be generated. 
 By default, Windows Firewall logs are not enabled, therefore no log information is kept if a VNC 
connection is made inbound or outbound. However, if the Windows firewall logging is enabled, then 
the VNC connection is logged on the log file. The firewall log file is located under 
C:/Windows/System32/LogFiles/Firewall 
 The application stores the chat conversation logs under the folder 
C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\RealVNC.  
TightVNC  
TightVNC is a free application, and works the same way as RealVNC. The application also stores the 
application settings and logging information on both the Windows Registry structure and locally on the 
computer hard drive. The connection server password used by the TIghtVNC server is encrypted with DES 
encryption, in a similar way to how RealVNC server encrypts its password. As stated early the encryption is 
weak and can be defeated easily to retrieve the server password. The table below shows the artefacts left by 
RealVNC application on Windows 10 machine. 
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Table 4: TightVNC Windows Registry Analysis 
 Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\TightVNC\Server, the application stores the 
configuration settings for the TightVNC server, this includes also the encrypted password for the 
server. This password is used to connect to the server.  
 Just like RealVNC the connection password is encrypted with DES and therefore password can be 
attacked with password cracking tools. 
 Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\TightVNC\Viewer, the application stores all the 
connection history of the local computer making VNC connections outbound. Therefore, the registry 
key stores all the IP addresses the TightVNC server has made connection to another external VNC 
server.  
 Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\TightVNC\Server, the application also stores the 
configuration settings for the TightVNC server, this includes also the encrypted password for the 
server. This password is used to connect to the server. 
 
Table 5: TightVNC Logs on Windows File System 
 The application leaves log information in the Windows Event Viewer under the Application Logs. The 
logs show client IP address that made the connection to the TightVNC server, and the connection logs 
for the computer made a connection to another VNC server. 
 The application stores the connections and application log settings on the hard drive. The log file 
includes all the connection details, including the client IP address and any files transferred during the 
connection. The file is located under C:\ProgramData\TightVNC\ Server\Logs. 
However, by default the application logging is not enabled, therefore a user will need to enable logging 
for the logs to be generated.  
 Also, the application does not log any outgoing VNC connections, therefore if a user makes a VNC 
connection to an external VNC server, no logging information is kept by the application. 
 By default, Windows Firewall logs are not enabled, therefore no log information is kept if a VNC 
connection is made inbound or outbound. However, if the Windows firewall logging is enabled, then 
the VNC connection is logged on the log file. The firewall log file is located under 
C:/Windows/System32/LogFiles/Firewall 
 
Citrix GoToMyPc 
Citrix GoToMyPc is an application that can be used to access remote computers over internet connection. Unlike 
VNC applications, GoToMyPc application does not require client and server, allowing invitations to other users 
to remotely access their computer. The connection is done over HTTPS 443 TCP port; therefore, it does not 
require to have an independent port open on the firewall to work.  
The user initially will need to register on the Citrix GoToMyPc website and add remote computers to the 
registered account. However, the remote computers need to have a GoToMyPc installation to receive the remote 
connections. User will need to log in to the account and then initiate a remote connection by selecting the 
computer defined on the user account. Someone can also send out an invite to connect a computer that is not 
registered to the account and initiate a connection if accepted by the guest user. The application uses end to end 
encryption during the remote connection using the AES 128bit encryption standards (GoToMyPc, 2016). The 
table below shows the artefacts left by RealVNC application on a Windows 10 machine. 
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Table 6: GoToMyPc Windows Registry Analysis 
 Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\WOW6432Node\Citrix\GoToMyPc, the application stores all the 
configuration settings. The settings include encrypted access code with Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) 128-bit encryption standard, email address of the person the account is registered under and 
other various settings. 
 The application also keeps are the records of guest invites send to connect to the GoToMyPc 
workstation. These settings can be located under 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\WOW6432Node\Citrix\GoToMyPc\GuestInvite. 
 Under the registry value 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Citrix\GoToMyPc\FileTransfer\history and 
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-97110503-761733263-3747825532-
1001\SOFTWARE\Citrix\GoToMyPc\FileTransfer\history, the application stores the hostname of the 
computer made the remote connection, including the location of any files transferred during the remote 
session process. 
 
Citrix GoToMyPc application did not log any access or connection logs on the local computer. The application 
instead stores the connection logs on the user’s GoToMyPc online account. Hence no logs were available on the 
local computer of any type of connections made or received. Also, no connection or applications logs were 
stored on the Windows Event Viewer logs.  
Teamviewer 
Teamviewer is an organisation founded in 2005 in Germany that provides web based collaboration solutions and 
remote desktop capable support to the users. The application can be used by users to remotely control another 
computer that has the application installed on it. The application works over TCP port 443 and uses RSA 
public/private key exchange and AES 256-bit session encryption to secure the connection traffic (TeamViewer, 
2016). The table below outlines artefacts left behind by the application on the Windows Registry File Structure. 
Table 7: Teamviewer Windows Registry Analysis 
 Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Teamviewer; registry key value, it stores the 
application settings including the account name of the Teamviewer account. This is the email address 
used to login on to the Teamviewer account. The application also stores the username of the local 
computer. 
 Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\WOW6432Node\TeamViewer and HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-
97110503-761733263-3747825532-1001\SOFTWARE\Teamviewer; registry values, the application 
stores the all the encryption keys and certificates that is generated, when a remote connection is 
initiated and other Teamviewer settings. 
Table 8: Teamviewer Logs on Windows File System 
 The application stores the incoming connection logs under the C:\Program Files (x86) 
\TeamViewer\Connections_incoming, the file includes all the incoming connections to the computer. 
However, Teamviewer doesnot use an IP address or email address for initiating a remote connection, 
instead it uses a unique random generate number, which is used as a ID to initiate a connection.  
 Under the same folder C:\Program Files (x86) \TeamViewer\, Teamviewer stores a log file named 
“TeamViewer11_Logile”, this file contains all the remote connection information, including the client 
ID, the public IP address of the client that made the connection, log entries for any files transferred 
during the remote session. This is crucial for the forensic investigation as it can be used to track down 
an individual with a Public IP address. 
 
The application stored no connection or applications logs were stored on the Windows Event Viewer logs. 
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LOGMEIN 
LogMeIn provides remote connectivity solutions to organisation for collaboration and IT management. The 
organisation was found in 2003 and provides servers to user to access and connect to remote computers. The 
LogMeIn client initially establishes a connection to LogMeIn servers and authenticates itself with a TLS1.X 
certificate. Once the identity is verified the user can then connect to and exchange data to another host to 
computer associated to the LogMeIn account. The application uses TLS based certificate authentication and uses 
AES or Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) encryption 128-bit or 256-bit encryption standards (LogMeIn, 
2016). The table below outlines artefacts left behind by the application on the Windows Registry File Structure. 
Table 9: LogMeIn Windows Registry Analysis 
 Under the registry key, HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn\Toolkit\DesktopSharing, 
the application stores the last guest recipient email address used to invite a user to remote into the 
computer. 
 Under the registry key, HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn\Toolkit\Filesharing, the 
application last guest recipient email address used to share a file transfer from the computer. 
 Under the registry key, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn, the application stores all 
the configuration settings and user preferences. The registry value also stores user guest invite settings. 
 Under the registry key, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn\V5\WebSvc\Shared, the 
application stores details about any files shared to the remote user. 
 
Table 10: LogMeIn Logs on Windows File System 
 LogMeIn application logs all the connection logs both incoming and outgoing to a log files located 
under the C:\ProgramData\LogMeIn folder. There are two logs files that contain connection settings 
including the public IP address of the remote user and basic remote connection settings used for the 
connection.  
 The log files also contain information about file transfers and send over to remote computer, such as 
name of the file, location of the file and file type. 
 The logs also contain details any incoming remote connections initiated to the computer by an external 
remote user. This includes the public IP address of the computer initiating the remote connection. 
 The application incoming and outgoing remote connection is stored and captured on the Windows 
event viewer, under the Application logs. The log entry stores public IP address of the guest user 
connecting to the computer.  
 Once the remote user ends the connection or logged out, another log entry is created capturing the 
event with the IP address and the time stamp of the connection. 
 
As identified above on the results, the RDA do leave behind useful artefacts such as IP addresses and email 
addresses of individuals who have remoted in a computer. This information can be used by law agencies and 
forensic investigators to prosecute or assist them to develop their investigations further. The application 
incoming and outgoing remote connection is stored and captured on the Windows event viewer, under the 
Application logs. The log entry stores public IP address of the guest user connecting to the computer. The logs 
also show information such as file name, type and location of files been transferred to the remote computer. This 
can be used to find exactly what the kind of files were transferred and the location of the file on the local and 
remote computer. All the applications store some sort of encrypted credentials and certificates on Windows 
registry hive. However, VNC applications store server connection password on DES encryption standard, a less 
secure and can be cracked easily by password cracking tools. 
Comparing the results of previous research done by (Kerai, 2010), there is not a much difference on how RDA 
leave behind artefacts. Especially RealVNC and TightVNC applications do leave behind reasonable number of 
artefacts including the connection encrypted password used by the applications  
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CONCLUSION 
Remote desktop applications provide end users and organisations the ability to remote in to networks and 
computers to manage and troubleshooting network related issues. Due to its ease and graphical interface, the 
adoption of remote access application is rapidly increasing. There are benefits of RDA to organisations and 
individuals, however the technology can also be exploited by criminals, cyber groups and terrorist groups to 
perform illegal activities on remote computers and networks. 
As shown above, several RDA leave behind local artefacts which can be of importance to forensic investigation. 
This is a large impact to government law enforcements agencies and forensics investigators to recover any 
potential artefacts left behind by the applications on the computer for further investigations. The artefacts can be 
used to investigate crimes committed by individuals who have transferred explicit, illegal and terrorism relates 
materials and documents over the remote connection. 
The research conducted has verified that the remote applications do leave artefacts behind and can be assessed 
and reviewed in forensically sound manner. Further research will explore and compare other remote 
applications, along with evaluating the applications use on different operating systems. Providing further 
important artefacts that can be of a forensic interest.  
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